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Abstract The choice of the proper discount rate is important in the analysis of
projects whose costs and benefits extend into the future, a particularly striking
feature of policies directed at climate change. Much of the literature, including
prominent work by Arrow et al. (1996), Stern (2007, 2008), and Dasgupta (2008),
employs a reduced-form approach that conflates social value judgments and
individuals’ risk preferences, the latter raising an empirical question about choices
under uncertainty rather than a matter for ethical reflection. This article offers a
simple, explicit decomposition that clarifies the distinction, reveals unappreciated
difficulties with the reduced-form approach, and relates them to the literature. In
addition, it explores how significant uncertainty about future consumption, another
central factor in climate policy assessment, raises further complications regarding the
relationship between social judgments and individuals’ risk preferences.
Keywords Discount rate . Risk preferences . Policy assessment under uncertainty .
Climate policy
JEL Classification D63 . D81 . H43 . Q54 . Q58
The standard welfare economic framework for policy assessment holds that social
welfare, W, is some function of the utilities, U, of all individuals in society, which in
turn are (under a common simplification) a function of individuals’ levels of
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consumption, c. How consumption affects utility, including, in particular, the rate at
which marginal utility falls with consumption, is, of course, an empirical question,
the answer to which is derived from individuals’ behavior under uncertainty
(Vickrey 1945). By contrast, how utility affects social welfare is a normative
question, that is, a social judgment that is made by an outside observer.
In the context of climate change assessments, however, these two distinct
concepts are frequently conflated, typically in discussions of the choice of a social
discount rate to be applied to postulated streams of consumption over time. Instead
of separately specifying the social welfare function W and individuals’ utility
functions U, analysts use a single, reduced-form representation, Z(c), under which
social welfare is taken to be a direct function of consumption. In this article, we
identify a number of problems with this practice.
In Section 1, we show how conceptual confusion arises because Z(c) has both
empirical and ethical components that are not clearly distinguished. As we will
explain, analysts sometimes confound pertinent empirical evidence on risk
preferences and normative arguments, with the result that understanding is
undermined rather than advanced. For example, in this Journal, Dasgupta (2008)
presents “a fairly complete account of the idea of social discount rates as applied to
public policy analysis” in which his analogue to Z(c) is at some points viewed as a
representative individual’s utility function and at others as a concave function of
utility reflecting an outside observer’s social judgment. In so doing, he is in excellent
company, joined, for example, by Stern (the Stern Review 2007, and his Ely Lecture
published in the American Economic Review 2008) and by Arrow, Cline, Maler,
Munasinghe, Squitieri, and Stiglitz (1996). Muddling the analysis of the social
discount rate is highly consequential since the choice of this rate is potentially
decisive concerning whether present efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions
should be aggressive or modest. Compare, for example, Nordhaus (2007, 2008),
Stern (2007, 2008), and Weitzman (2007).
Moreover, attempts to sort out the questions formally are inhibited by the use of this
reduced form. It might appear that such a composite representation is unproblematic;
after all, W is a function of individuals’ U’s, which in turn are functions of their c’s.
However, analysis often focuses on a single parameter, η, for the curvature (elasticity)
of Z(c), which is mistakenly assumed to be a simple combination of the corresponding
curvature parameters for U(c), that is, risk aversion, and W(U), aversion to inequality
in utilities. Denoting these curvature parameters by α and β respectively and
considering a simple special case that most closely corresponds to the functional forms
used in the literature, we have η=1−(1−α)(1−β). Furthermore, the implied social
welfare function that most directly rationalizes existing practice has problematic
features, including that it can violate the Pareto principle.
One way to summarize the implications of Section 1’s analysis is to say that,
relative to current practice, the social discount rate should in most cases be based
more on empirical evidence of individuals’ risk preferences than on ethical
reflection. That is, debates about the correct discount rate should attend more to
the economics of decision-making under uncertainty.
This perspective is reinforced in Section 2 where we explicitly incorporate
uncertainty about the future consumption path, a signal feature in climate policy
assessment where there is significant doubt about the magnitude of climate change
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for given emissions, the economic impact of a given degree of climate change, the
rate at which future emissions control costs will fall, and other matters. Although this
subject has also received prior attention in the literature, once again difficulties arise
from the failure to separate concavity in individuals’ utility functions, reflecting risk
preferences, and concavity in the social welfare function, reflecting ethical
judgments. We examine the interaction of uncertainty in future consumption with
strict concavity of the social welfare function and identify yet another (qualitatively
different) source of conflict with the Pareto principle.
Zeckhauser and Viscusi (2008, p. 95) have remarked on “the intertwined
problems of time and uncertainty” that arise with regard to discounting. The present
investigation suggests that there are more connections than meet the eye and that the
failure to disentangle them makes the analysis of a challenging set of problems even
more difficult.

1 Individuals’ risk preferences versus social judgments
1.1 Formulation in climate change analysis
We adopt a number of simplifications that are standard in the literature and largely
orthogonal to our main points. Specifically, we suppose that there is only a single
individual in each generation—perhaps a representative individual or one of many
identical individuals, with a constant population size over time—a problematic restriction
that we partially relax in Section 2.1 The individual’s utility U is a function (only) of
available consumption c in the pertinent time period. In this section, we focus on the
problem of choosing among feasible, certain consumption paths over time, c(t), each
corresponding to different policies, so as to maximize social welfare. (In Section 2, we
examine the choice among uncertain consumption paths.) It is convenient to employ the
continuous time representation, in which case the expression for social welfare SW is

Z1
SW ¼

W ðU ðcðtÞÞÞedt dt:

ð1Þ

0

In this expression, δ is taken to be a pure social rate of time preference, one that some
analysts argue should equal 0, reflecting a view that all generations should be weighted
equally, or some low level that reflects the likelihood that humanity will become
extinct. Although there is important debate about the choice of δ, we set the issue to the
side. We instead focus on the term W(U(c)), where we often suppress the t, focusing on
some arbitrarily chosen generation.
1

When there is heterogeneity within generations—which is enormous across the world’s population—the
summary for a generation is itself properly understood as a composite of a social welfare function and
individuals’ utilities, rather than simply a utility function, so it too would need to be decomposed to do the
analysis correctly. Indeed, even with a utilitarian social welfare function that merely sums all individuals’
utilities within the generation, the manner in which total utility depends on aggregate consumption in the
generation, and changes thereto along different policy paths, generally cannot be summarized simply as
some individual’s utility function, although the summary function for the generation will obviously
depend directly on individuals’ utility functions, as well as on how consumption is distributed.
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In place of expression (1), it is common to find (in addition or instead) the
following variant, which then becomes the focus of analysis:
Z1
SW ¼
ZðcðtÞÞedt dt:
ð2Þ
0

At this point, a further simplification (also tangential to our purposes) is sometimes
introduced, namely that consumption c has a constant growth rate of g (also denoted

c =c). An additional common assumption, which we will explore further momentarily,
is that the function relating a generation’s level of consumption to its contribution to
social welfare has the form ZðcÞ ¼ c1h =1  h. Given all this, one can show that the
social rate at which the stream of consumption should be discounted is the constant rate
r ¼ hg þ d:

ð3Þ

For concrete illustrations of the differing implications, one might roughly follow some of
the Stern Review’s (Stern 2007) parameters, η=1, g=1.3, and δ=0.1, yielding ρ=1.4.
By contrast, using Nordhaus’s (2008, p. 61) choices of η=2 and δ=1.5 and employing
the growth path implicit in his simulation, the result is ρ=5.5. When discounting over
periods of 50 or 100 years (or more), the differences are staggering.
Our focus is on how the value of η should be determined and interpreted. As is clear
from the foregoing, η is a property of Z(c). But that function is a reduced form. The
motivation for such a function, usually unelaborated, is that it is a composite of W(U)
and U(c). Accordingly, we wish to know how η relates to the curvature of the
underlying welfare and utility functions.2 This decomposition is critical even to
formulating what questions to ask since the properties of W are a matter of ethical
debate whereas those of U are empirical; specifically, the curvature of U depends on
preferences concerning decisions under uncertainty. We wish to know whether the
choice of η in the literature is a normative question, an empirical question to be resolved
by the literature on risk preferences, or some combination. And what combination?
1.2 Decomposition
To begin, we introduce notation for the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion parameter
and analogues thereto for each of our three functions of interest:

2

RU ¼ 

cU 00 ðcÞ
;
U 0 ðcÞ

ð4Þ

RW ¼ 

UW 00 ðU Þ
; and
W 0 ðU Þ

ð5Þ

RZ ¼ 

cZ 00 ðcÞ
:
Z 0 ðcÞ

ð6Þ

This question is examined in the intragenerational context with regard to the optimal income taxation
literature in Kaplow (2010), which provides the basis for the analytical approach in this section.
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Single and double primes denote first and second derivatives with respect to the
function’s direct argument; in particular, W′ and W″ denote the corresponding
derivatives of W with respect to U (and not with respect to c).
The core of our analysis involves taking seriously the notion that the reduced
form Z(c) is really the composite function W(U(c)). Specifically, we assume that the
widespread use of the reduced-form Z(c) function is implicitly motivated by—and
really has to be grounded in—a welfare economic framework under which social
welfare depends in some justifiable fashion on individuals’ utilities in each
generation that, in turn, in the models at hand, depend on consumption in each
generation.
To pursue this course, one can take the first and second derivatives of the
composite function W(U(c)) with respect to c, which with some rearrangement yields
RZ ¼ 

cU 00 ðcÞ cU 0 ðcÞW 00 ðU Þ

:
U 0 ðcÞ
W 0 ðU Þ

ð7Þ

Multiplying the second term by U(c)/U(c), letting εU denote the elasticity of utility
with respect to consumption (equivalently, the ratio of the marginal utility of
consumption, U′(c), to the average utility of consumption, U(c)/c), and making
substitutions using the notation from expressions (4) and (5), this expression can be
rewritten as
RZ ¼ RU þ "U RW :

ð8Þ

Expression (8) indicates how to determine the relevant curvature of the Z(c)
function when that function is taken to be a composite of the welfare function W and
the utility function U (rather than some arbitrary reduced form that is chosen without
regard to the underlying social welfare function and utility function). Of interest is
the fact that the curvature of Z is not a simple sum of the curvatures of U and W. The
latter is weighted by εU. Note that this factor can be quite low in wealthy societies
(as mentioned, it equals the ratio of the marginal to the average utility of
consumption), so in that setting, the curvature of U is relatively more (perhaps
much more) important (assuming that the curvature of W is not extreme, as with a
Rawlsian maximin social welfare function).3
To make the foregoing more concrete, it is useful to consider (as is common in the
literature) the case in which the R’s are constant.4 Specifically, for U and W, suppose
that
U ðcÞ ¼

W ðU Þ ¼

c1a
; and
1a
U 1b
:
1b

ð9Þ

ð10Þ

For further discussion regarding the magnitude of εU, see Kaplow (2005, 2010).
Throughout, if the pertinent constant equals 1, the natural log functional form should be employed
instead.

3
4
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Using these functional forms and continuing to suppose that Z(c) = W(U(c)), we
have
ZðcÞ ¼ ð1  aÞb

cð1aÞð1bÞ
; or
ð1  aÞð1  bÞ

ð11Þ

ZðcÞ ¼ ð1  aÞb

c1g
;
1g

ð12Þ

where γ=1−(1−α)(1−β).5
1.3 Discussion
These expressions for Z(c) are not what one might have expected from typical
discussions, where, as mentioned, the standard reduced form is ZðcÞ ¼ c1h =1  h.
There is the additional leading term in (11) and (12). Perhaps more surprising is the
manner in which the curvature parameter for the reduced form (γ in our
expression 12, η in the standard representation) relates to those for the underlying
utility and welfare functions. Pursuing the latter, the familiar expression (3) for the
overall social discount rate can be rewritten as follows:
r ¼ ð1  ð1  aÞð1  bÞÞg þ d:

ð13Þ

First, consider the functional relationship depicted in this expression. Taking the
plausible case in which α>1, we see that a higher curvature parameter β for the
social welfare function implies a lower rather than a higher discount rate—even
though g>0, so that future generations are richer. Likewise, the sign of the effects for
both α and β reverse when the other parameter crosses the value 1.0. Hence, familiar
intuitions translating such curvature parameters for the U and W functions into
overall curvature (γ in expression 12 or η in expression 3) fail.6
Second, reflecting on the decomposition more broadly, we find (as Section 1.4
elaborates in the climate change context) that some explications of the curvature
parameter η are confusing and potentially misleading because of the failure to separate
the two conceptually distinct sources of curvature. Determination of the curvature of
individuals’ utility functions, α in our constant-relative-risk-aversion special case in
expression (9), presents an empirical question that is usually addressed by examining
individuals’ choices under uncertainty (Vickrey 1945). Granted, its magnitude is
subject to serious dispute. The literature has generated a wide range of estimates, and
there are concerns about whether the behavior on which such estimates are based is
fully informed and rational. See, for example, Barsky et al. (1997), Campbell (1996),
Chetty (2006), Choi and Menezes (1992), Kocherlakota (1996), and Zeckhauser and
5
The right side can be reduced to α+(1−α)β, which shows the correspondence with expression (8), noting
that, for this functional form for U, εU =1−α.
6
The situation is not as bad as may first appear when one realizes that, for α>1, expression (9) for utility
is negative. Accordingly, if one employs negative values for β rather than positive ones and considers
higher magnitudes for β (which correspond to lower, negative values) to represent greater social aversion
to inequality in utility levels, the familiar relationships are restored. See Kaplow (2010, p. 34).
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Viscusi (2008). Nevertheless, the existence of debate about empirical evidence on risk
preferences does not justify analysts substituting their own values.
By contrast, the curvature of the social welfare function, β in our expression (10),
is a normative judgment subject to a quite different sort of analysis. See, for
example, the conflicting views represented in Sen and Williams (1982). It is
interesting to consider the case of a utilitarian social welfare function, which has
received some endorsement, most famously from Harsanyi (1953, 1955), and seems
to be accepted by many economists.7 (See also our further discussion in Section 2.)
In that case, β in expression (10) is zero, and the Z(c) function is coincident with the
U(c) function. The difficulties with expression (13) become moot, and the reducedform parameter η simply equals α. In this case, the question of the proper value for η
is entirely an empirical one since, as explained, α is a property of individuals’ utility
functions that is ordinarily taken to be revealed by behavior under uncertainty. On
the other hand, for a nonutilitarian social welfare function, explicit justification
would have to be offered for the parameter β.
Relatedly, it is problematic, but common, to advocate the use of particular values
for η without regard to specifications of the underlying U and W functions, the
values of α and β in our special case. Consider, for example, the belief that η should
be taken to equal 2. If it turned out that, empirically, individuals were nearly risk
neutral, this would entail the view that a utilitarian social welfare function was
insufficiently egalitarian. However, if evidence revealed instead that individuals
were quite risk averse, with α>2, then one would have to switch one’s ethical
position to the view that utilitarianism is too egalitarian. Coherent normative
principles for assessment cannot be contingent on empirical facts. Accordingly,
when performing sensitivity analysis on an empirical parameter, it is expected that
changing the parameter will change the results, but it is not appropriate for the social
welfare function to be simultaneously changed as different values for the empirical
parameter are considered. Put another way, optimal decisions depend on the
particular circumstances, but the proper decision-making criterion should not.
Third, we turn to an important and neglected question concerning the reducedform approach: What social welfare function (if any) is implied by this
methodology? Specifically, suppose one wishes to generate the standard reducedform Z(c) function, ZðcÞ ¼ c1h =1  h, starting from the familiar constant-relativerisk-aversion utility function U(c) in expression (9), where again the curvature
parameter η in the reduced-form Z(c) function is taken to equal 1−(1−α)(1−β). We
are inquiring into the implied welfare function W(U). One might have thought it
would be the function given by expression (10), but it is not. It is straightforward to
show that the implied social welfare function is
W ðU Þ ¼ ð1  aÞb

7

U 1b
:
1b

ð14Þ

Interestingly, Mirrlees (1982, p. 77 n. 21) takes the occasion of his essay in the Sen and Williams volume
to clarify that, in his seminal optimal income taxation paper, Mirrlees (1971), he meant to represent a
utilitarian social welfare function, so his curvature parameter needs to be interpreted as a possible value for
the curvature of individuals’ actual utility functions, not as the degree of social inequality aversion, which
depends on the social observer’s ethical preferences.
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Expression (14) works in the mathematical sense just described, and it appears
to be similar to expression (10). However, the result is normatively problematic.8
Although it may not be immediately apparent, the stated form is not an
individualistic social welfare function. To restate a basic point in welfare
economics: Under an individualistic social welfare function, social welfare is
taken to be a function only of individuals’ utilities and not, importantly, of any
aspect of how those utilities were produced. Formally, this means that one can
write W(U(x)), where x is a complete description of a state of the world. This
functional form contrasts with W(U(x),x), which means that social welfare, in
addition to depending on individuals’ utilities, can also depend directly on some
trait of the state of the world. That is, some aspect of the world may affect social
welfare even if it affects no one’s utility. Or, more relevant for our purposes, it can
affect social welfare independently of (or different from) how it affects individuals’
utilities.
Consider the manner in which expression (14) deviates from the more familiar
individualistic social welfare function. In addition to the appearance of β, which is a
parameter of the welfare function and therefore not problematic, there is also α,
which of course is a parameter of individuals’ utility functions, which appears other
than through the utility function. The direct implication is that different individuals
(here, generations) would count more or less depending on the curvature of their
utility functions (even if, say, they have the same utility level). This property is
inconsistent with the standard normative framework. Indeed, it seems bizarre. It is as
if two generations had different tastes, one preferring chocolate and the other vanilla,
and both achieved the same utility; perhaps chocolate and vanilla are each produced
at the same cost and each generation chooses more of the flavor it prefers.
Nevertheless, the social welfare function depends directly on preferences for
chocolate versus vanilla and thus weights one of the two generations more than
the other on that account.
The problem actually is worse, for it can be shown that this feature implies that
the social welfare function (14) can favor choices that violate the Pareto principle. To
demonstrate this point, suppose that there are two social states, each producing
precisely the same utility levels for all individuals (in our setting, for individuals in
all generations), but one involves a different value for α. (To give a possible
motivation, a different climate path may affect how consumption is transformed into
individual utility, but there might also be a different consumption path as well, one
that produces an offsetting effect on utility such that the utility level in each
generation is the same.) Under the social welfare function (14), these identical utility
profiles, produced by two different regimes, will have different values for social
welfare because the α’s in the leading term will differ. This difference implies that,
starting with the regime yielding lower social welfare, we might imagine that there
exists a small policy adjustment that would raise utility in each generation slightly.
This modified regime would still have lower social welfare according to expression
(14)—assuming that the change is sufficiently small—even though it yields higher
8
Another seeming difficulty is that, when α>1, as is plausible, expression (14) involves a negative base
raised to a real exponent. However, one can combine the first term with U b and substitute for U using
(9), which yields cbð1aÞ .
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utility for all generations. Hence, the social welfare function (14) sometimes
instructs society to choose policies that reduce everyone’s well-being.9
1.4 Application
The analysis thus far casts discussion of the social discount rate in economic policy
analysis in a different light. This claim can be illustrated by work on climate change. We
begin with Dasgupta’s (2008) extensive treatment in this Journal and follow with Arrow
et al. (1996) and Stern (2007, 2008). As will be seen, the problems we identify are not
particular to certain authors or papers but are widespread and have a common pattern.
Dasgupta (2008): Dasgupta’s framework is fairly typical of much of the literature,
which is not surprising since the article is an interpretative survey designed to have
this feature. Converting his main expression for social welfare (Dasgupta 2008,
expression 2) to the continuous time analogue, he has

Z1
SW ¼

U ðcðtÞÞedt dt:

ð15Þ

0

On its face, it is hard to know whether this welfare function is comparable to
expression (1) or to expression (2) above. It is equivalent to both if the social welfare
function is utilitarian. As mentioned, in that case W(U) = U, and Z(c) = W(U(c)) = U(c).
However, Dasgupta is explicit in not limiting himself to the (formally) utilitarian case
(e.g., allowing that “U [may be] not felicity, but an increasing, concave function of
felicity” [p. 147]).10 And, as will be discussed, he clearly envisions that the curvature
is to be chosen by a social observer rather than determined empirically.11 In short, the
U function in Dasgupta is emphatically not a utility function—making his choice of
notation unfortunate. Similarly, he regularly uses the term “felicity” (with no adjective
“social”) and occasionally “well-being” (again with no preceding adjective) to refer to
social welfare, not individuals’ well-being (although some usages earlier in the article
do refer to individuals’ utility, rather than social welfare).
Dasgupta’s U(c) must, in our notation, be a Z(c) function, meaning that the proper
analogue to expression (15), Dasgupta’s social welfare function, is expression (2), not
expression (1). In that case, the problematic nature of working directly with a reducedform Z(c) function is fully applicable to Dasgupta’s analysis and to that of those whom
he is following in this regard. Indeed, Dasgupta focuses on the functional form
9

This conclusion follows from Kaplow and Shavell’s (2001) demonstration that any nonindividualistic
social welfare function violates the Pareto principle.
10
In his note 4, Dasgupta might be understood to adopt a utilitarian view as he explicitly rejects the
prioritarian approach. Yet he states that a “utilitarian” can “assign” a lower “social” value to increases in
consumption of the rich versus the poor, and his later statements, some mentioned below, embrace what
many refer to using the language of prioritarianism.
11
To take another example, Heal’s (2005, pp. 1110, 1121–22) prominent survey employs a social welfare
function like that in expression (15), explicitly adopts a utilitarian view, and hence appears to avoid the
problems we raise. Nevertheless, when elaborating in other writing on how one determines the curvature
of utility, he takes the same position as Dasgupta and others: “Of course the choice of the form for the
utility function, and therefore the value of [η], is also an ethical choice [like the choice of δ].” (Heal 2009,
p. 281.)
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U ðcÞ ¼ c1h =1  h and derives an expression for the social discount rate for
consumption corresponding to expression (3) above (Dasgupta 2008, expression 4a).
To illustrate the difficulties, Dasgupta (2008, p. 147) begins a key part of his
discussion by posing the question: “How should the social evaluator choose U.”
Since this function is chosen by a social evaluator rather than reflecting individuals’
choices under uncertainty, as measured by an empiricist, he is taking the question of
the proper value of η to be entirely a question of ethics. This approach would make
sense if he was implicitly assuming that α is zero (i.e., individuals are risk neutral),
so that the decomposed η simply equals β, but this stance would be contrary to the
evidence. He elaborates that many would infer the parameter from choices people
make, but he states that he is taking the view of those who adopt a philosophical
approach. Moreover, he criticizes others, including Stern, for inconsistency because
they chose “η on the basis of estimates obtained from consumer behaviour, but
ignored consumer behavior entirely when it came to the choice of δ and sought the
advice of moral philosophers instead. This is neither good economics nor good
philosophy” (p. 159). However, under a utilitarian social welfare function, this is
precisely the correct economics and philosophy since η is a parameter of individuals’
utility functions and δ is entirely an aspect of the social welfare function. On the
other hand, Dasgupta’s analysis—under which individuals’ utility functions, as
reflected in their choices under uncertainty, are wholly ignored in choosing η despite
what is apparent in expression (8)—is difficult to rationalize.
Another issue in Dasgupta’s exposition—again mirroring some other prominent
work—concerns how he believes a social observer should choose η. At various
points, he endorses the use of thought experiments in which one backs out parameter
values, taking as primitives what one deems to be reasonable policy conclusions
(such as on how high of an optimal savings rate is plausible). That is, one first
determines correct policy conclusions in certain settings—based on what seem to be
sensible, rather than absurd, outcomes—and then asks what ethical parameter is
consistent with that conclusion. The problem is that this process reverses normative
analysis. The method would be appropriate if one were attempting to determine what
normative parameter is implicit in some actual society’s policy choices. For example,
in the optimal income tax problem, one can back out a polity’s social welfare
function from its policies (and empirical parameter estimates). Note that if, in
Dasgupta’s example, a high savings rate is rejected, this may well reflect that society
does not care that much about future generations. (He instead takes as a given that
they value far distant generations equally with themselves and infers that they
therefore must be highly inequality averse and hence will not make significant
sacrifices for even astronomically large benefits for those in the far future.)12 In any
12

Consider the case in which a thought experiment is conducted and it turns out that most would be
unwilling to undertake a cost-beneficial medical research project at a cost of $50 billion, but rather would
pay only $1 billion. Should one conclude that if, say, saving lives were the benefit, it must be that the
proper social value on life is, say, only $100,000 rather than $5,000,000, despite revealed preference
evidence favoring the latter figure? Or that the proper social welfare function places a tiny weight on the
affected group (individuals who happen to contract the particular disease)? Or that respondents implicitly
disbelieve the estimates of expected benefits? Or—our preferred interpretation—that our intuitions about
plausible amounts to spend on medical research are way off the mark (which is part of why we undertake
explicit cost-benefit analysis, after first determining our value of life and what we believe to be the proper
social welfare function)?
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case, his analysis fails to reflect that, even if one adopts a social welfare function that
is strictly concave in individuals’ utilities, expression (8) makes clear that the
empirical question of the curvature of individuals’ utilities—their risk preferences—
will be an important (and possibly the much larger) component of the proper value
for aggregate curvature, the η in Dasgupta’s analysis.
Arrow et al. (1996): The well-known treatment of the social discount rate in Arrow
et al. (1996) is much the same. Their social welfare function (expression 4A.1) is13

Z1
SW ¼

W ðcðtÞÞedt dt:

ð16Þ

0

(This expression is immediately followed with a version of our expression 3, their 4A.2.)
This formulation again raises the question: Is the social welfare function in (16)
properly compared to expression (1) or expression (2) above? Closely related, is their
function W(c) a utility function, a social welfare function, or a reduced-form composite?
They tell us that their W is “welfare,” which might suggest social welfare, but
immediately thereafter they refer to their analogue to η as “the elasticity of marginal
well-being, or marginal utility” and then follow by presenting a “convenient form of
W [as] one giving a constant elasticity of marginal utility” (p. 134). Just as one is
about to conclude that their W is a utility function, meaning that the social welfare
function in expression (16) is implicitly utilitarian, they state: “A higher value of [η]
means greater emphasis on intergenerational equity. As [η]→∞, the well-being
function in (4A.1) resembles more and more the Rawlsian max-min principle; in the
limit, optimal growth is zero” (p. 135). Hence, in the end, their W(c) function has to
be understood as the analogue to our reduced-form Z(c) function.
Accordingly, the foregoing analysis is fully applicable to their treatment as well. To
illustrate the potential for confusion, consider the following statement that appears under
the heading “Diminishing marginal utility,” immediately after a discussion of utility that
unmistakably refers to individuals’ actual utility functions as revealed by their behavior:
“Just as the choice of the rate of pure time preference ([δ]) has important implications
for intergenerational equity, as discussed above, so does the choice of the elasticity of
marginal utility. The more weight the society gives to equity between generations, the
higher the value of [η]” (p. 136, emphasis added).
Stern (2007, 2008): Begin with the Stern Review (Stern 2007). On one hand, the
presentation seems to eschew the reduced-form approach. It states (p. 44) that one
can think of “overall welfare, W, calculated across households (and generations) as a
function of the welfare of these households.” The social welfare function for the
simple case (Stern’s expression 3) is stated to be

Z1
SW ¼

U ðcðtÞÞedt dt:

ð17Þ

0
13
There is a typographical error in the original, the omission of the variable of integration t from the
exponent of e.
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Although this is identical to expression (15), suggesting that U should be understood as a
reduced-form welfare function, this function is introduced by informing the reader that it
presents “a very special additive form of W.” Hence, the interpretation is that U is indeed
a utility function and expression (17) should be understood as a utilitarian social welfare
function. Furthermore, attention is focused (Stern’s expression 6) on the case in which
U ðcÞ ¼

c1h
;
1h

ð18Þ

leading to the interpretation that his η corresponds to our α, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, an empirical parameter of individuals’ utility functions reflecting their
choices under uncertainty. Stern then presents his analogue to our expression (3) (his
expression 8).
However, this interpretation turns out to be incorrect, or at least misleading. Stern
states (p. 44) that “[t]he joint specification of W and [U] constitutes a set of value
judgments which will guide the assessment of consequences.” One might have
expected him to have said that the specification of W constitutes a value judgment,
whereas the specification of U does not, but rather involves an empirical assessment
of individuals’ risk preferences. All ambiguity is eliminated in his discussion of his
version of expression (17), which had been described explicitly as a utility function
(recalling that he purports to be using a utilitarian social welfare function): “η which
is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption…is essentially a value
judgment” (p. 46). As we have discussed, however, it is hard to understand how the
proper choice of an empirical parameter constitutes a value judgment.
This subject is elaborated further in Stern (2008). He discusses how one “can
interpret η as the parameter of relative risk aversion in the context of an expected
utility model of individual behavior” (p. 17). After noting familiar behavioral
anomalies, he claims that “there is very little to guide us.” From that, he somehow
concludes that “we must address the ethics directly.” For example, he argues that
“direct ethical discussion…suggests a broad range for η, although the consequences
for simple transfers suggest that many would regard η in excess of 2 as unacceptably
egalitarian.”14 We find it difficult to understand how an actual, empirically grounded
parameter of a utility function could be objected to on normative grounds.
There appear to be two ways to interpret Stern’s discussions. One is that he adopts
a social welfare function that is utilitarian (additive) in functional form but rejects a
subjectivist view of utility, instead deeming individuals’ utility functions for
evaluative purposes to be something to be chosen by the social observer, with the
curvature parameter being based on ethical views concerning the distribution of
consumption (without regard to how consumption actually influences individuals’
utilities).15 The other is that he is following the fairly common approach of viewing
Later, Stern (2008, p. 23), in summarizing his discussion, refers to choosing a higher value for η, such
as η=2, as “taking on board the positions of two commentators on the Review—Weitzman (2007a, b)
argued for greater emphasis on risk and uncertainty, and Dasgupta (2007) for more egalitarian values than
those captured by η=1,” suggesting the mixed role Stern associates with the single parameter of his
reduced-form representation.
15
In discourse in moral philosophy, this is sometimes referred to as an objectivist view of well-being or a
perfectionist ethical stance.
14
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U(c) as really a reduced-form social welfare function of sorts, tantamount to our
Z(c). In any case, the distinct conceptual roles of the W and U functions, and the
distinct types of arguments and evidence pertinent to each, are obscured.16

2 Extension: Uncertain future consumption
As mentioned in the introduction, uncertainty is one of the most striking features of
the climate change problem; actually, it is an important element of any policy
analysis pertaining to the distant future. For analytical purposes, we will simplify by
supposing that all pertinent uncertainty—whether pertaining to climate change itself,
its impacts on the economy, costs of emissions reductions in the future, or unrelated
phenomena—can be summarized by its effects on the consumption path, which we
now denote by c(t,θ), where θ indicates the state of the world (each θ corresponding
to an entire consumption path). We further assume that θ has density function f (θ)
and is distributed on the unit interval [0,1].
It is now possible to express expected social welfare (which we continue to
denote by SW ) as follows:
Z 1 Z1
SW ¼
W ðU ðcðt; qÞÞÞedt dt f ðqÞdq:
ð19Þ
0 0

Given the time-separable form of our social welfare function, we can reverse the
order of integration.

Z1 Z 1
SW ¼
0

W ðU ðcðt; qÞÞÞf ðqÞdq edt dt:

ð20Þ

0

Focusing on the contribution to social welfare in each period (the inner integral,
abstracting from the pure social rate of time preference), we note the familiar
property that, for any t (and assuming strict concavity of U and that f (θ) is not
degenerate):
0 0 1
11
Z1
Z
B B
CC
W ðU ðcðt; qÞÞÞf ðqÞdq < W @U @ cðt; qÞf ðqÞdqAA:
ð21Þ
0

0

In other words, the expected social welfare associated with any period is reduced on
account of uncertainty relative to what it would be if consumption instead were
certain at its expected value, which for later convenience we will denote by cðtÞ.
Consider the case in which uncertainty is greater at more distant time periods.17 In
this case, the contribution of the future to aggregate social welfare will be
16

Interestingly, the treatment of utility functions and the social welfare function in Stern’s (1976) seminal
article on the optimal linear income tax similarly conflates the two. See Kaplow (2010).
17
Keep in mind that this statement is as viewed from the present, time 0. Uncertainty regarding climate
change may well fall over time as more is learned, but present policy decisions need to be based on current
information. The prospect of learning does, of course, introduce an important option value element to
optimal policy determination. See Gollier and Treich (2003) and Summers and Zeckhauser (2008).
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diminishing over time, again, relative to the case in which the consumption path took
on its mean value with certainty. Now, to assess policies involving different
consumption paths, we want to examine the effect of marginal changes in
consumption on social welfare. Focus initially on the utility function U, which
would be appropriate if the social welfare function were utilitarian, as in Gollier
(2008).18 Although this function is strictly concave, marginal utility is strictly
convex for standard functional forms of utility; that is, U′′′>0.19 This property
suggests that the effects of changes in consumption in the future can be relatively
more consequential on account of uncertainty. To illustrate this point, consider a
policy that raises consumption at time t by a common increment in all possible states
θ. Comparing the marginal contribution to social welfare in period t between the
uncertainty and certainty cases, we note that

Z1

U 0 ðcðt; qÞÞf ðqÞdq > U 0 ðcðtÞÞ:

ð22Þ

0

The greater the degree of uncertainty about outcomes in period t, the greater is the
marginal gain from such a project.
The foregoing illustration supposes that we are considering a policy that raises
consumption in period t by the same increment regardless of the state θ. More
generally, policies implemented today will have different effects on consumption in a
given period in different states. Of particular value are policies that, ceteris paribus,
raise consumption most in the lowest-consumption states (the standard premium
favoring negative covariance projects). With climate policy, for example, the worst
states might correspond to those in which the degree of climate change for given
emissions is the most severe; moreover, due to nonlinearities, incremental mitigation
may well have the greatest payoff in those situations. In such a case, the expected
utility gain from the future consumption benefit would be larger on two counts
related to uncertainty: uncertainty itself amplifies the marginal gain, and the benefit
would be concentrated in the lowest-consumption and hence highest-marginal-utility
states, which further augments the increase in expected utility.
This too, of course, is just a hypothetical example. Nevertheless, this brief sketch
indicates the potentially great importance of taking into account that future
consumption streams are uncertain. Related, failing to attend to the fact that policies
may have different effects in different states could also lead to significant
misassessments of policies’ social value. Summarizing a policy’s effects in terms
of a single, mean influence on the consumption path, c(t), is therefore quite
problematic. Likewise, because of possible correlations among uncertain elements,
such as the impact of a project and the prevailing state of nature, as in the preceding
18

Gollier (2008) uses this framework to explore the term structure of discount rates under various
assumptions about the structure of uncertainty (specifically, regarding the possible nonconstancy of
volatility) whereas we focus, as in Section 1, on the interrelationship between the curvatures of U and W.
19
This condition is often termed “prudence,” referring to an individual’s inclination to save more when
uncertainty about future consumption increases. See Gollier (2008) and Kimball (1990). Decreasing
absolute risk aversion is a stronger, sufficient condition; an even stronger sufficient condition is constant
relative risk aversion (as in expression 9).
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example, one cannot properly substitute certainty equivalents, component by
component, which is sometimes done to simplify analysis.20
Until now, we have considered only the implications of the curvature of U. If
W is not utilitarian but instead is strictly concave, one’s intuition might be that the
aforementioned phenomenon would be magnified. This view, however, is
incomplete in two respects. First, Section 1 explored in detail the difficulties in
drawing simple interpretations regarding the composite function W(U(c)), and
these problems persist in the present context. For example, if one were trying to
take certainty equivalents, one would have to reinterpret them to reflect the
concavity of W in addition to that of U. Perhaps not surprisingly, the literature’s
treatment of uncertain consumption paths largely mirrors its analysis of the
certainty case and thus does not avoid any of the problems. For example, the Stern
Review (Stern 2007, p. 49) uses the same construction and notation that we
examined and found wanting in subsection 1.4 when it turns to uncertainty over
the growth path of consumption.
Second, the problems with failing to properly distinguish between the W and U
functions are greater when we introduce uncertainty over consumption paths
because now we are interested in the curvature of the marginal impact on social
welfare. In this case, just as we had to specify the sign of U′′′, with a strictly
concave W function we also need to know the sign of W′′′(U(c)). Specifically, if
one takes the third derivative of W(U(c)) with respect to c, there are four terms:
three are unambiguously positive given our assumptions about U and with W
strictly concave, and a fourth takes the sign of W′′′(U(c)). The shape of W is a
normative matter, as we emphasize in Section 1. To our knowledge, the question of
its appropriate third derivative has not been a subject of analysis or reflection
(except implicitly for the utilitarian social welfare function, where the third
derivative is zero).
To elaborate further on both the utility and social welfare functions, it is worth
observing that all of the notation and expressions in this section for the case of
uncertainty are formally equivalent to what one would employ to represent the certainty
case but with an unequal distribution of consumption within each generation. Compare
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973). Instead of indexing states, θ would index individuals.
Consider, for example, the statement of Arrow et al. (1996, p. 130, emphasis omitted): “Most
economists believe that considerations of risk can be treated by converting outcomes into certainty
equivalents, amounts that reflect the degree of risk in an investment, and discounting these certainty
equivalents. There is general agreement that in evaluating competing projects, all spending, including
investment, is to be converted into consumption equivalents first, then discounted.… Environmental
impacts may be incorporated by converting them to consumption equivalents, then discounting.” One
might justify examining each component separately if, in computing the certainty equivalent, one took
account of the covariance of that component with overall consumption (in the one-factor model we are
considering) and if, moreover, each component was small. In the climate policy context, however, the
latter assumption is not regarded to hold.
There is another, quite different sort of problem that may arise: double counting of the costs of
uncertainty. For example, in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007, p. 137), it recommends
“transformation of the random benefit into its certainty equivalent for each maturity” and then “[i]n a
second step, the flow of certainty-equivalent cash flows is discounted at the rates recommended above.”
However, to the extent that those recommended rates are ones that are already adjusted downward on
account of the interaction of uncertainty in future consumption flows with curvature in individuals’ utility
functions, this certainty equivalent adjustment would be incorrect.

20
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Accordingly, instead of different levels of consumption in different states, we
would have different levels of consumption for different individuals. The density
of a given state would correspond to the density of individuals with the
designated level of consumption. Expressions (19) and (20), for expected social
welfare for the case where there is only a single (representative) individual in each
generation, would now indicate social welfare for heterogeneous individuals in
each generation, but now in the case of certain consumption paths. Expression (21)
would indicate that social welfare is lower on account of inequality (holding
average consumption constant) and expression (22) that a uniform increase in
everyone’s consumption raises welfare more when the preexisting distribution of
consumption is unequal.
One also could combine intragenerational inequality and consumption path
uncertainty by focusing on the combination of the two phenomena in terms of the
likelihood that an individual would experience a given level of consumption in a
particular generation. More precisely, for each given state of nature there would be
associated with it not a single level of consumption in generation t, but some
distribution of consumption across individuals in that generation. Therefore, for each
level of possible consumption in a generation, there would be a weight (density)
indicating the aggregate likelihood that some individual would experience that level
of consumption. At this point, we could, as with the inner integral in expression (20),
integrate over that density to obtain the contribution to social welfare associated with
that generation. Given the importance of intragenerational inequality (mentioned
previously in note 1) and the magnitude of uncertainty about future consumption, the
sorts of adjustments described here could be quite important to policy assessment.
Introducing uncertainty about future consumption when one employs a strictly
concave social welfare function raises additional issues that have received little
attention. These relate to some normative work on the choice of the social welfare
function that shows how nonutilitarian social welfare functions can conflict with the
Pareto principle and raise further problems.21 To explore the former in the present
context, consider again the inner integral in expression (20) or, equivalently, the left
side of expression (21). They denote E[W(U(c))], the expected value of welfare as a
function of utility (in a given generation). Sticking with the representative individual
interpretation, compare this to the W(E[U(c)]), social welfare as a function of
expected utility. When W is strictly concave, we have
0 1
1
1
Z
Z
B
C
W ðU ðcðt; qÞÞÞf ðqÞdq < W @ U ðcðt; qÞÞf ðqÞdq A:
ð23Þ
0

0

The expression in large parentheses on the right side of (23) is the expected utility
(not expected social welfare) for the representative individual in generation t. (Note
21
Pareto conflicts, time inconsistency, and other matters are examined, for example, by Kaplow (1995)
and the literature discussed therein. Note that the Pareto conflict considered here is qualitatively different
from that explored in Section 1: there, the problem arises from the social welfare function depending
directly on an empirical parameter rather than being solely a function of individuals’ utilities; here, we are
assuming that social welfare depends only on individuals’ utility functions but addressing how
nonlinearity of the social welfare function can produce Pareto violations in the presence of uncertainty.
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also that this term differs from that on the right side of (21), where the expectation is
over c and not U(c).)
If the representative individual in generation t were behind the veil, so to speak, at
time 0, that individual would wish to maximize the expected value of U(c),
suggesting that U(c) should be the social maximand and not W(U(c)).22 One way to
see the argument is to compare two policies that hold constant the situation of
individuals in all other generations but provide different outcomes for generation t,
as follows: the first policy yields slightly higher expected utility than does the
second policy, but it produces a sufficiently higher variation in utility levels that the
integral on the left side of expression (23) is lower than that for the second policy.
(Such a situation is possible whenever W is strictly concave.) The individual in
generation t would prefer the policy with the greater expected utility but society
would prefer the other due to its lower variance in utility levels. For this oneindividual society, a strictly concave W therefore leads to a violation of the Pareto
principle. Moreover, one could replicate this formulation for all t, which would
generate a strict Pareto violation: all generations would be worse off under the policy
deemed best by the strictly concave social welfare function W.23
Stepping back from the immediately preceding point to the observation that the
uncertainty case is isomorphic to intragenerational inequality, we can see from yet
another perspective how the curvature of an evaluation function influences
assessments under uncertainty and also other sorts of evaluation. In Section 1, we
explored how curvature (of both W and U) influences not only decisions under
uncertainty but also allocations over time, a point that is familiar from individual
utility maximization: greater concavity of U makes consumption smoothing more
valuable. In this section, we have focused instead on uncertainty about future
consumption. In all instances, risk preferences dictate the assessment of outcomes
that might be unequal, whether with certainty or due to uncertainty. The behind-theveil perspective suggests that this deep connection applies to thinking about the
social welfare function as well as contemplation of individuals’ utility functions.

3 Conclusion
Much of the literature on discount rates, and particularly that addressed to assessing
climate change policies, uses a reduced-form approach under which consumption
flows over time are discounted. A key component of the overall social discount rate
(and the main or only component for those who hold egalitarian views toward
22

This perspective is originally advanced by Vickrey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953).
One could attempt to avoid this difficulty by adhering to the strictly concave W but insist that it operate
on expected utility rather than on realized utility. This alternative formulation, however, raises other
difficulties. Notably, it requires a particular categorization of different sources of uncertainty: behind the
veil, uncertainty regarding identity is treated qualitatively differently from uncertainty regarding outcomes
associated with each identity. (Suppose there are two individuals behind the veil, who will each, with 50%
likelihood, be actual persons A and B; moreover, there are two outcomes, High and Low. If A receives
High for sure and B receives Low for sure, we use the strictly concave W to assess the regime. But if
whether A rather than B gets High or Low depends on a single coin flip, we do not use the strictly concave
W but just the U functions. In a sense, all the difference depends on whether the identity-determining coin
is flipped before or after the coin indicating the linkage of identities to particular outcomes.)
23
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individuals in different generations) is captured by a single parameter reflecting the
curvature of a reduced-form function of consumption.
In principle, this parameter needs to be derived from the underlying social welfare
function and individuals’ utility functions. We have made this decomposition
explicit. Doing so reveals a number of anomalies in the standard approach and many
respects in which leading discussions of the issues are in some respects confused and
potentially misleading. The central problem concerns the conflation of social
judgments, an entirely normative matter, and estimates of individuals’ utility
functions, specifically, their risk preferences, a purely empirical question. Viewed
properly, empirical evidence on the curvature of individuals’ utility as a function of
consumption is a central factor, and the only one under a utilitarian social welfare
function. Ethical argumentation is entirely appropriate (indeed, necessary) regarding
the choice of the social welfare function, but it is inapposite when measuring
individuals’ risk preferences. In reviewing the climate change literature, we find that
authors often invoke ethical views when they should be attending much more to
empirical evidence on individuals’ decision-making under uncertainty.
When we address uncertainty in future consumption paths, a striking feature of
climate policy assessment, we show that the same difficulties of conflating curvature
due to individuals’ risk preferences and that attributable to social judgments are
manifest. Indeed, the implications of a strictly concave social welfare function (in
contrast to individuals’ utility functions exhibiting risk aversion) have received little
attention in this context, and we identify some significant problems that have not
previously been recognized.
At one level, some of these points are familiar, even elementary. On the other
hand, they are often forgotten or confused, even in the leading expositions on the
subject. And the explicit analysis of uncertainty introduces conceptual challenges
that are not appreciated. This article seeks to advance understanding through a clear,
distinct formulation and also to elaborate the specific ways in which analysis can go
awry when familiar reduced-form representations are substituted for explicit
decomposition that distinguishes curvature due to individuals’ risk preferences from
that attributable to social judgments.
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